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LAIDLA WAND THE CLEAN WATER ACT: STANDING IN
THE BERMUDA TRIANGLE OF INJURY IN FACT,
ENVIRONMENTAL HARM, AND "MERE" PERMIT
EXCEEDANCES
Alberto B. Lopez"
I. INTRODUCTION

"What's it to you?" is the question that then judge Antonin Scalia,
sitting on the District of Columbia Court ofAppeals in 1983, said should
be asked of plaintiffs in citizen suits under environmental statutes.' This
"rude question" is appropriate, wrote Justice Scalia, to ensure that
plaintiffs can demonstrate sufficient injury in fact to satisfy a court's
standing analysis.2 Standing, in general, refers to the ability of a plaintiff
to bring a lawsuit against a particular defendant." The concept of
standing serves a gate-keeping function that ensures that only those who
have an interest in the outcome of litigation be allowed to participate in
it.' Modem standing analysis utilizes a three-pronged scheme that asks
whether a plaintiff has suffered injury in fact, whether the defendant
caused the injury, and if the court can redress the plaintiff's injury.'
Because standing analysis is used as a safeguard to prevent courts from
becoming "debating societies," 6 an insufficient answer to Justice Scalia's
question threatens to toss environmental plaintiffs out of court before
getting to the merits of their claims. If making such a direct inquiry
became standard, the judiciary could put a dagger into the heart of its

"long love affair with environmental litigation."'
Congress enacted many of the modem environmental statutes during
the 1970's on the heels of the popular support that followed the first
Earth Day on April 22, 1970.8 Seeking to protect the nation's water* J.S.D. Candidate, Stanford Law School; J.S.M., Stanford Law School; J.D., Indiana University
School of Law-Indianapolis; M.S., University of Notre Dame; B.S., Rose-Hulman Institute of
Technology. I would like to thank myJ.S.D. advisor, Professor Lawrence Friedman, for his support during
my time at Stanford. I would also like to thank Professor Ronald Krotoszynski of Washington & Lee
University School of Law for his timely advice.
1. Antonin Scalia, TeDoctrine ofStandingasanEssenia/dnlweni ofdUu
SeparationofPowers, 17 SUFFOLK
U. L. REv. 881, 882 (1983).
2. See Steve France, What's It To rou?, 85 A.B.A.J., Oct. 1999, at 36, 36.
3. See KENNETH DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE §§ 24:1-24:36 (2d ed. 1982).
4. Seid.
5. See Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans United for Separation of Church &State, Inc.,
454 U.S. 464, 472 (1982).
6. I at 477.
7. Scalia, supra note 1,at 882.
8. See ROBERT PERCIVAL ET AL.; ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION 4 (1992).
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ways, Congress enacted the Federal Water Pollution Control Act in
1972 (also called the Clean Water Act or CWA).9 The Clean Water Act
of 1972 changed the legal scheme for protecting the nation's water
supply from a singular assessment of water quality standards to one
establishing effluent limitations.'" By shifting the focus from water
quality standards to effluent limitations, Congress sought to eliminate
the imprecision associated with water quality standards and increase the
level of enforcement of the CWA." With its goal "to restore and
maintain the chemical, physical, and biological integrity of the Nation's
waters, ' 2 the focus on effluent limitations in the CWA began a new era
in the prevention of water pollution.
The change in the scheme for protecting the nation's waterways went
hand in hand with a change in the enforcement of environmental laws.
In the 1960s, for example, governmental agencies failed to enforce
federal environmental legislation with dispatch or vigor.' 3 "Cumbersome and ineffective" procedures caused the enforcement of environmental laws to fall far below an acceptable standard. 4 Given the failure
to enforce the laws, Congress designed an alternative to governmental
enforcement-the citizen suit.' 5 By enacting citizen suit provisions,
Congress gave citizens the right to enforce environmental laws and seek
remedies for violations of them. First drafted into the Clean Air Act of
1970, Congress envisioned that citizen suits would be "an efficient policy
instrument and.., a participatory, democratic mechanism that allows
'concerned citizens' to redress environmental pollution."' 6 Moreover,
citizen suits provided the answer to the failed enforcement measures of
the past "whether caused by lack of will or lack of resources."1 7 Despite
limited governmental resources, Congress thought that citizen suits
could spur governmental enforcement or provide an alternative method

9. See FREDERICK R. ANDERSON ETAL, ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION: LAW AND POLICY 590
(1999).

10. SeeJohn Dolgctta, Fiendsofthe Earth v. Crown Central Petroleum: TSurratp Enforcer Must
Be Allowed to "Stand Up"forthe Clean WaterAct, 15 PACE ENVTL L. REV. 707, 710 (1998) (noting that water
quality standards relied on the assimilative capacity of the body of water while effluent limitations focus on
the amount of pollutant that a polluter may discharge into any given body of water).
11. Said
12. 33U.S.C.§ 1251(a)(1994).
13. ,&eJEFFREY G. MILLER, CITIZEN SUITS: PRIVATE ENFORCEMENT OF FEDERAL POLLUTION

CONTROL LAWS 3 (Wiley Law Publications 1987). Miller cites UnitedSts v.Bishop Processing Co., 423 F.2d
469,470-72 (4th Cir. 1970), as an example ofthe previous ineffective federal enforcement procedures. Se
id. In that case, the plant emitted a "horrible interstate stench," but due to the enforcement procedures,

plaintiffs failed to obtain a remedy for at least eight years. Id (internal quotations omitted).
14.
15.

MILLER, supra note 13, at 3.
&e id.
at 4.

16. Michael S.Greve, The Prika Enforcement ofEnvironmen aL,
17. MILLER, supra note 13, at4.

65 TUL. L REV. 339,340 (1990).
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to penalize violators."8 As a result, Congress created citizen suits in
many of the environmental statutes enacted during the environmental
decade.19
With the authorization of citizen suits in the major environmental
statutes, private citizens undertook the task of enforcing their regulations. To augment this effort, courts initially subscribed to a broad
understanding ofwhat had to be shown to satisfy the injury in fact prong
of standing analysis. In Sierra Club v. Morton,20 the Supreme Court held
that injuries to abstract concepts such as aesthetics qualified as injury in
fact under environmental statutes. 2' AlthoughJustice Stewart noted in
a subsequent case that the standing inquiry must be more than an
"ingenious academic exercise in the conceivable," the Court nonetheless
continued to hold that subjective injuries
affecting many individuals met
22
the requirements to obtain standing.
While courts subscribed to a broad concept of standing under the
environmental statutes in the past, recent developments in standing
jurisprudence restricted access to the courts for environmental plaintiffs.
Three opinions penned by Justice Scalia curtailed the broad requirements for standing recognized in cases such as Sierra Club v. Morton and
23
United States v. Students ChallengingRegulatory Agency Proceedings (SCRAP).
Despite the recent constriction of standing for citizens under environmental statutes, the Supreme Court had an opportunity to clarify the
confusion about the issue this term in Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw
Environmental Services (TOC), Inc.24 While Laidlaw involved important
issues of mootness and the propriety of civil fines paid to the United
18. Seeid
19. See, e.g.,Toxic Substances Control Act § 20, 15 U.S.C. § 2619(a) (1988); Endangered Species
Act § 1l(g), 16 U.S.C. § 1540(g)(1) (1988); Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act of 1977 § 520,
30 U.S.C. § 1270(a) (1988); Surface Marine Protection, Research, and Sanctuaries Act§ 105(g), 33 U.S.C.
§ 1415(gXI) (1988); Resource Conservation and Recovery Act§ 7002,42 U.S.C. § 6972(a) (1982 & Supp.
V 1987); Clean Air Act § 304, 42 U.S.C. § 7604(a) (1982); Safe Drinking Water Act § 1449,42 U.S.C. §
300j-8(a) (1982 & Supp. V 1987); Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability
Act, 42 U.S.C. § 9659(a) (1982 & Supp. V 1987); Noise Control Act § 12, 42 U.S.C. § 491 l(a) (1982);
Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act § 23,43 U.S.C. § 1349(a) (1982); Deepwater Port Act § 16,33 U.S.C.
§ 1515(a) (1988). The only major environmental statute without a citizen suit provision is the Federal
Insecticide, Fungicide and Rodenticide Act (FIFRA), 7 U.S.C. § 3136(g) (2000). The absence of such a
citizen suit section is the result of political differences in the enacting legislative committees. The
Agriculture Committee enacted FIFRA in both Houses while the other statutes were enacted by the Senate
Environment and Public Works Committee and the House Commerce and Transportation Committee.
See MILLER, supra note 13, at 6.
20. 405 U.S. 727 (1972).
21. Id at734.
22. See United States v. Students Challenging Regulatory Procedures, 412 U.S. 669, 688 (1973)
[hereinafter SCRAP]; infta notes 70-73 and accompanying text.
23. 412 U.S. 669,688 (1973). The three opinions are Lujw v. Nafional Wildlife Fd'n,497 U.S. 871
(1990); L*jan v. Defmders of Wddle, 504 U.S. 555 (1992); and BmweU v.Spear, 520 U.S. 154 (1997).
24. 120 S. Ct. 693 (2000).
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States Treasury to redress public wrongs, the Court examined the issue
of standing as a precursor to these issues.25
Although the Court found that the plaintiffs in Laidlaw had standing
to pursue the case, the Court did little to quell the confusion regarding
the standing of citizen suit plaintiffs. The purpose of this paper is to
examine the injury in fact requirement for standing under the Clean
Water Act after Laidlaw. Part II of this paper briefly describes the
history of standingjurisprudence, particularly that which involves injury
in fact. Part III traverses the familiar case law involving the issue of
standing under the environmental statutes in general. Part IV briefly
describes the goals and provisions of the CWA. Part V canvasses cases
involving the standing of citizens to pursue violations of the CWA in
court and includes a description of the Laidlaw decision. The portion of
the Laidlaw decision regarding the injury in fact prong of standing
analysis is analyzed in Part VI. This Article argues that citizens should
have broad standing to pursue violators of the Clean Water Act because
of its text, legislative history, and the evidence presented to courts to
support a finding of injury in fact. The paper concludes that the failure
to grant standing to its full extent under the Clean Water Act is a
violation of the separation of powers by the federal courts, a charge
typically levied at Congress for enacting the citizen suit provisions
themselves.
II. A BRIEF HISTORY OF STANDING

In early American courts, the concept of standing as a limit on the
ability of courts to try cases did not exist.26 Early American courts
focused on whether a plaintiff had a legal cause of action vindicable by
the courts instead of using the modem doctrine of standing." Courts
simply looked to see whether Congress or the common law conferred a
right to sue upon the plaintiff.28 In fact, the concept of injury in fact
played no role in determining whether or not a cause of action existed.29
Thus, courts made "a sharp distinction between an injury on the one

25. Id. at 703-04.
11H, 91
26. See Cass R. Sunstein, What's StandingAfter Lujan? Of Citi en Suits, "Injurie," and Artice
MICH. L. REV. 163, 170 (1992) (noting that nobody believed that the Constitution limited Congress's
power to confer causes of action from the rounding era through 1920).
27. Seeid.
28. See William A. Fletcher, 77 eStructure ofStanding, 98 YALE LJ.221, 224 (1985) (stating that the
courts looked to common law, statutory, constitutional rights, or a mix of statutory and constitutional
prohibitions along with common law remedial principles).
29. SeeSunstein, supra note 26, at 170.
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hand (a 'harm') and a legal injury on the other." 30 A court had the
power to remedy a legal injury, but could do nothing about indiscriminate harm.
While courts initially focused on legal injury to determine who could
lawfully bring suit, that focus began to shift during the 1930s. Faced
with a failing economy in the wake of the Depression, President Franklin
D. Roosevelt attempted to stimulate the economy via government
intervention. 3' However, government intervention into the economic
affairs of the nation contravened legal policy at the time, which heralded
individual freedom in the marketplace. 32 Nevertheless, President
Roosevelt set forth an ambitious series of programs designed to bolster
the ailing economy. 33 Some measures met fierce resistance, such as the
court-packing plan, 34 and the overall aggressive nature of New Deal
reforms occasioned the retirement of several Supreme CourtJustices.35
As a result of Court turnover, two Supreme CourtJustices, Brandeis and
Frankfurter, obtained the power necessary to check Court intrusion into
governmental policy.3 6 The doctrine of standing stood chief among the
doctrines developed to curb Court oversight of governmental action.3
With the growth of the administrative state caused by New Deal
reforms, the question of who could bring suit to enforce agency duties
became a pressing concern. 3' To tackle this problem, Congress enacted
the Administrative Procedures Act (APA) in 1946. 3' The APA, codifying
30. Id. at 171 (noting that such is acase of damun absqueinjuria [harm without injury in the legal
sense]).
31. Se Laveta Casdorph, The ConstitaionandReconstitution ofe&SktamsdiagDocme., 30 ST. MARY'S LJ.
471, 485 (1989) (citing KERMIT L HALL, THE MAGIC MIRROR: LAW INAMERICAN HISTORY.241-42
(1989)).
32. See id (discussing how Locmer v. aVw York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905), allowed Court intrusion into
legislation regulating the work environment).
33. Se id(noting that Roosevelt's actions challenged historical relationships between politics and
law).
34. RICHARD B. MORRIS, ENCYCLOPEDIA OFAMERICAN HISTORY 356 (1961) (asserting that the
plan involved mandatory retirement forjudges once age 70 is reached or an expansion of the Court from
9 to 15 members ifjudges at age 70 refused to retire, adding up to 50 judges at all levels of the federal
judiciary, routing appeals of lower court constitutional decisions directly to the Supreme Court, a
requirement that government attorneys argue a case before a lower court issues an injunction in a
constitutional case, and reassignment of districtjudges to expedite the judicial process); LAWRENCE M.
FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW 685-86 (2d ed. 1985) (noting that the plan backfired but
Roosevelt had the last laugh despite the rejection of the plan because he outlasted "nine old men").
35. S&eMORRIS, supra note 34, at 357.
36. See Sunstein, supra note 26, at 179.
37. Sweid. at 180 (observing thatJustices Brandeis and Frankfurter invoked thejusticiability doctrines
to limit attacks on legislative and administrative action in key cases).
38. SeeFletcher, supra note 28, at 225 (stating that determining who could sue to enforce the legal
duties of an agency was one of the important questions during the 1930s).
39. Administrative Procedure Act, Pub. L. No. 79-404, 60 Stat. 243 (1946) (codified as amended
at 5 U.S.C. § 702 (1994)).
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'"judge-made" standing law, ° provided that "[a] person suffering legal
wrong because of agency action, or adversely affected or aggrieved by
agency action within the meaning of a relevant statute, is entitled to
judicial review thereof."' 4' By enacting the APA, Congress recognized
that causes of action could be created by common law principles, legal
wrongs based upon statutory provisions, or express grants of causes
based upon statutes other than the APA.42 Thus, the APA authorized
a wide range of individuals to participate in rulemaking or enforcement
activity in the burgeoning administrative state.
As time passed, the increase in administrative regulation combined
with public enforcement of the APA to create more litigation to enforce
public values. 3 In the hallmark case of Flast v. Cohen," the Supreme
Court allowed a plaintiff to challenge the distribution of federal monies
to parochial schools on Establishment Clause grounds.45 Although the
plaintiff did not suffer an injury distinct from the public at large, the
Court found a sufficient nexus between the plaintiffs status as a
taxpayer and the claim for purposes of standing. The Court held that
the taxpayer had a "clear stake" in maintaining the boundary between
the Establishment Clause and the taxing and spending power of
Congress.' In short, the Court advanced the idea that not only those
who suffered a legal wrong had the ability to bring suit, but that ability
4
should also be available to those who benefited from statutory lawY.
Soon after Flastv. Cohen, the Court decided a case that would turn the
law of standing on its head. In Association of Data Processing Service
Organizationsv. Camp,' the Court broke with the past view of standing
and laid down the underpinnings of the modern idea of the concept. In
DataProcessing,a group of data processors sought a declaratoryjudgment
40. Se Sunstein, supra note 26, at 181-82. Sunstein asserts that the drafters of the APA designed the
statute to recognize three types of cases that had been established under previous law. SeeiU First, a
plaintiff could gain standing by showing that he had suffered a "legal wrong." Id Second, a plaintiff
obtained standing by showing that statutory interests were at stake. Seid Third, plaintiffs could bring suit
if they showed that a statute other than the APA entitled them to bring suit. Seeid
41. Administrative Procedure Act, Pub. L No. 79-404, 60 Stat. 243 (1946) (codified as amended
at 5 U.S.C. § 702 (1994)).
42. SeeSunstein, supra note 26, at 181-82.
43. See Fletcher, supra note 28, at 227 (observing that federal suits during the 1960s and 1970s sought
to establish and enforce public or constitutional values by litigants who were not affected by the acts
complained of in a way different from the rest of the general population).
44. 392 U.S. 83 (1968).
45. Id at 102-03.
46. Seeid at 105-06 (holding that a taxpayer may challenge the constitutionality of a taxing and
spending program implemented by Congress ifa logical connection existed between the status as a taxpayer
and the claim made by plaintiffs).
47. SeeSunstein, supra note 26, at 184 (noting that this arose in part due to the recognition of the
difficulty plaintiffs faced when attempting to organize which allowed agencies to succumb to political
pressure).
48. 397 U.S. 150 (1970).
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invalidating a rule allowing banks to provide data processing services to
their customers. 9 Although the lower courts found that the plaintiffs
had standing to bring their case, the Supreme Court reversed their
decision in an opinion by Justice Douglas . Because, according to the
Court, the traditional "legal interest" test for standing went to the merits
of the case, it constituted an inappropriate inquiry to determine who
could properly bring suit.5' Instead, the Court fashioned a two-pronged
test to determine who had standing to sue. To establish standing, a
plaintiff needed to show "injury in fact" and an injury "arguably within
the zone of interests to be protected or regulated by the statute or
constitutional guarantee in question. '' 52 In sum, standing moved from
being53 an issue based upon law to one based upon the facts of each
case.

While the idea of injury in fact had been floating about since Baker v.
Carr,' Data Processingwas the first case to hold that plaintiffs must suffer
"injury in fact" to have standing. 5 Although intended to broaden the
class of people capable of bringing suit against an agency, the test
outlined by the Court had the perverse effect of denying standing to
some groups seeking to enforce various statutes. 56 Nonetheless, Data
Processing and its "injury in fact" inquiry is a key component of the
modem understanding of "injury in fact" as a requirement of Article
Indeed, a case often cited to illustrate the modem standing
1 1 1 .5
doctrine, Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans Unitedfor Separation of
Church & State, Inc.,5 cites Data Processingas a predecessor.59 Enumerating the modem requirements for standing in Valley Forge, the Court
asserted that a plaintiff must have suffered (1)injury in fact, (2) traceable
to the defendant, (3)that is redressable by a court.' Thus, the modem
test for standing incorporates the injury in fact requirement from Data
49. Id. at 155 (challenging the Bank Service Corporation Act of 1962, which stated that no bank
"may engage in any activity other than the performance of bank services for banks").
50. Seei at 154.
51.

Seeid. at 153.

52. Id. at 152, 156.
53. See Sunstein, supra
note 26, at 185 (characterizing the decision as "a remarkably sloppy
opinion").
54. 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
.55. See Fletcher, supra note 28, at 230 (citing Baker v. Can, 369 U.S. 186 (1962), and stating that
the "injury in fact" test owes its life in part to Professor Davis, who stressed that APA §10(a) should be
understood to require "injury in fact").
56. See Scalia, n*pra note 1, at 889-90 (criticizing the Data Prowesiqg test for creating the "weird" effect
of denying standing).

57. See Fletcher, supa note 28, at 230 (citing examples of its usage in Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490,
498-99, 501 (1975), and Schlesinger v. Reservists Comm. to Stop the War, 418 U.S. 208, 218 (1974)).
58. 454 U.S. 464 (1982).
59. Id. at 475 (reiterating the "zone of interests" requirement).

60. Seeid.
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Processing, a decision that has allegedly done "[m]ore damage to the
intellectual structure of the law of standing... than... any other single
decision."'"
III. THE HISTORY OF STANDING UNDER
ENVIRONMENTAL STATUTES

The starting point for any discussion of standing of environmentally
minded plaintiffs must be the Supreme Court's decision in Sierra Club v.
Morton. In Sierra Club, an environmental organization sought judicial
relief to prevent the proposed development of the Mineral King Valley
by Disney Enterprises.6 2 To combat the proposed development, the
plaintiffs sought a declaratory judgment claiming that a portion of the
plan violated federal laws governing the preservation of national parks,
forests, and game refuges.6 ' Addressing the issue of the plaintiff's
standing to sue, the Court noted that:
Aesthetic and environmental well-being, like economic well-being, are
important ingredients of the quality of life in our society, and the fact
that particular environmental interests are shared by the many rather
than the few does not make them less deserving of legal protection
through the judicial process.'
While the Court recognized aesthetic and other noneconomic
interests as meeting requirements for standing, the Court's broad
pronouncement did not help the Sierra Club. The Court continued,
"[b]ut the 'injury in fact' test requires more than an injury to a cognizable interest. It requires that the party seeking review be himself among
the injured."6 5 The Sierra Club failed to claim that any of its members
would be harmed by the proposed development.66 As a result, the Court
upheld the denial of standing to the Sierra Club and did not reach the
merits of the case.6
61. Fletcher, supra note 28, at 229.
62. Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 729-30 (describing the $35 million Disney plan as using
80 acres of land for motels, restaurants, swimming pools, parking lots and other structures for 14,000 daily
visitors).
63. Se id. at 730 (stating that the Sierra Club brought suit as a membership corporation with a
"special interest in the conservation and the sound maintenance of the national parks, game refuges and
forests of the country" and used APA § 10(a) as the basis for its claim).
64. Id. at 734.
65. Id. at 734-35.
66. Sm id. at 735 (noting that the Sierra Club did not"allege that itor its members would be affected
in any of their activities or pastimes by the Disney development. Nowhere in the pleadings or affidavits did
the Club state that its members use Mineral King for any purpose, much less that they use it in any way
that would be significandy affected by the proposed actions of the respondents").
67. Seeid. at 741.
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The Supreme Court's standing jurisprudence reached its outermost
limits the following year in United States v. Students Challenging Regulatoy
Agency Proceedings (SCRAP). In SCRAP, a group of law students asserted
that a freight rate increase proposed by the Interstate Commerce
Commission discouraged the use of recycled goods.6" Because of the
failure to use recycled materials, the students argued that the amount of
litter in the area would increase and that the usage of local natural
resources would increase.69 Learning from Sierra Club, the students
alleged that they themselves used the affected area for various outdoor
activities.7" Although the Court characterized the students' injury as
"far less direct and perceptible" when compared to that in Sierra Club, it
nonetheless granted standing to the students to pursue the case.7'
Given the broad interpretation of standing in Sierra Club and SCRAP,
standing for plaintiffs asserting environmental claims reached its "high
water mark."72 However, the Supreme Court began to let the air out of
the environmental movement's balloon in Lujan v. National Wildlife
Federation.3 In Lujan, an environmental organization challenged the
Department of Interior's decision to reclassify protected lands for use in
the public domain.7" According to the plaintiffs, the reclassification
"would open the lands up to mining activities, thereby destroying their
natural beauty."75 Applying lessons from other cases, the plaintiff
submitted affidavits of two of its members stating that they used lands
"in the vicinity" of withdrawn lands for recreational and aesthetic
enjoyment. 6
68. SCRAP, 412 U.S. 669,675-76(1973).
69. Se id. The students alleged that the added cost would cause members to suffer "economic,
recreational and aesthetic harm." Id Moreover, members asserted the rate increase decreased the usage
of recyclable materials, which ultimately encourage mining and lumbering among other activities that
harmed the environment. See id. The students alleged they would be forced to pay more for finished
products as economic harm and the destruction ofthe natural environment by mining or other acts harmed
their recreational and aesthetic interests. See id
70. S&e
id. at 678. The group asserted that each ofits members used the portions of the environment
affected by the damage around the Washington metropolitan area and that each member resided in the
same area. Se id Moreover, the claimants stated that they breathed the air in the affected area and that
pollution had accumulated as a result of the increased rate. See id
71. Id. at 687-88. The Court observed that the students alleged that the specific acts of the
respondent would harm them in their use of the natural resources of the affected area. Seeid Moreover,
the Court held that it would not deny standing simply because injury was widespread because to do so
"would mean that the most injurious and widespread Government actions could be questioned by nobody."
Id
72. PERCIVAL, supra note 8, at 726.

73. 497 U.S. 871 (1990).
74. Id. at 875. The plaintiffs asserted violations ofthe Federal Land Policy and Management Act
of 1976, the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, and APA § 10(e). Seeid
75. Id. at 879.
76. Id at 884-88. The affidavits belong to members Peggy Peterson and Richard Erman. In the
affidavits themselves, Peterson claimed that lands "in the vicinity" of the affected area in Wyoming had
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Although the Court of Appeals held that the affidavits supported a
finding of injury in fact to support standing, the Supreme Court
disagreed." The Supreme Court opined that the affidavits failed to
demonstrate that the members were "adversely affected or aggrieved"
within the meaning of section 702 of the APA.7" Instead the affidavits
stated only that the members used "unspecified portions of an immense
tract of territory, on some portions of which mining activity has
occurred or probably will occur by virtue of the governmental action."79
Distinguishing this case from SCRAP, the Court declared that the broad
concept of standing applied in that case did not apply to this case
because SCRAP involved a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss while this
case involved a summary judgment motion.8" In short, the Court
restricted its expansive view of standing by requiring specific facts to
support a finding of injury in fact.
The shaky ground on which environmental plaintiffs stood further
crumbled away in Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife." In 1983, the Department of the Interior decided that the Endangered Species Act (ESA)
only applied to governmental projects within the United States or on the
high seas. 82 As a result, developers or other businesses working on
overseas projects did not have to consult with the Fish and Wildlife
Service despite a threat to endangered species.83 An environmental
group brought suit under the citizen suit provision of the ESA asserting
that the new regulation violated the ESA itself8 4 To demonstrate injury
in fact, the plaintiff submitted two affidavits from its members.8 " Joyce
Kelly said she had visited the habitat of the Nile Crocodile in 1986 and
"intend[ed] to do so again, and hop[ed] to observe the crocodile
"been opened to the staking of mining claims and oil and gas leasing, an action which threatens the
aesthetic beauty and wildlife habitat potential of these lands." Erman made similar assertions about lands
"in the vicinity" of the affected lands in Arizona. Set id
77. Sm id. at 888.
78. Id. at 889.
79. Id.
80. See id. (noting that "[a]t the margins there is some room for debate as to how 'specific' must be
the 'specific facts' that Rule 56(e) requires in a particular case. But where the fact in question isthe one put
in issue by the § 702 challenge here-whether one of respondent's members has been, or is threatened to
be, 'adversely affected or aggrieved' by Government action-Rule 56(e) is assuredly not satisfied by
averments" of this general nature).
81. 504 U.S. 555 (1992).
82. Sm id. at 558-59.
83. Se id.
84. &e id. at 559. Plaintiffs asserted a violation of § 7(a)(2) which states that each Agency in
consultation with the Secretary should insure that Agency action "is not likely to jeopardize the continued
existence of any endangered species or threatened species or result in the destruction or adverse
modification of habitat of such species which is determined by the Secretary, after consultation as
appropriate with affected States, to be critical." Id at 558.
85. Seeid. at 563.
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directly." 6 Following a similar path, Amy Skilbred declared that she
viewed the Asian elephant and leopard in 1981 while visiting Sri Lanka
and intended to return for further observation.87 Thus, the affidavits
attempted to apply the rule of specificity from National Wildlife Federation
v. .,ujan.

Despite their attempts to show injury in fact, the Supreme Court
found that none existed. After restating the well-known requirements
for standing, the Supreme Court stated that injury in fact required more
than an injury to a cognizable interest." The injury suffered must be
"actual or imminent."89 In this case, the affidavits did not aver that the
members had definite plans to return to the allegedly affected areas.9"
Not only did the affidavits fail to show plans to return to the affected
areas, but they did not demonstrate that they used any portion of the
lands "perceptibly affected by the unlawful action."'" In sum, the
'9 2
affidavits failed to describe a "factual showing of perceptible harm."
While this conclusion swept Defenders of Wildlife out of court, the
Court's next conclusion altered the ability of citizen plaintiffs to bring
claims under environmental statutes in general. Although the Court of
Appeals found that plaintiffs had standing by procedural operation of
the ESA's citizen suit provision, the Supreme Court thought otherwise.93
The Court stated that "a plaintiff raising only a generally available
grievance about government-claiming only harm to his and every
citizen's interest in proper application of the Constitution and laws...
does not state an Article III case or controversy. '
To support its
reasoning, the Court embraced the doctrine of the separation of powers
by noting that "[v]indicating the public interest (including the public
interest in Government observance of the Constitution and laws) is the
function of Congress and the Chief Executive." 95 Further, the Court
opined that turning the "undifferentiated public interest in executive
officers' compliance with the law into an 'individual right' vindicable in
86. Id.
87. See id. at 563-64. Ms. Skilbred also declared that she did not know when she would return to
Sri Lanka because of the civil war at the time. See
iU She merely stated that she would return "[i]n the
future." Id.
88. See id. at 563.
89. Id at 564.
90. Seeid. (declaring that the affidavits stating that the two women "had visited" foreign lands proved
nothing). Citing Ciy ofLos Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95,102 (1983), the Court opined that "[p]ast exposure
to illegal conduct does not in itself show a present case or controversy regarding injunctive relief... if
unaccompanied by any continuing, present adverse effects."
91. Ljan, 504 U.S. at 566.
92. Id.
93. Sm id.
at 571-73 (characterizing the nature of the Court ofAppeals' holding as "remarkable").
94. Id. at 573-74.
95. 1 at 576.
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the courts is to permit Congress to transfer from the President to the
courts the Chief Executive's most important constitutional duty, to 'take
Care that the Laws be faithfully executed."' 96 Thus the Court feared
that citizen suits would give courts the authority to monitor the
propriety of executive acts, which is an impermissible delegation of
authority.
IV. THE CWA AND ITS NPDES
Because the CWA authorizes citizen suits to enforce its provisions, the
language of the CWA holds the key to the ability of plaintiffs to obtain
standing in court. The Clean Water Act begins by boldly declaring that
its objective is "to restore and maintain the chemical, physical, and
biological integrity of the Nation's waters."97 Furthermore, it is a
"national goal that wherever attainable, an interim goal ofwater quality
which provides for the protection and propagation of fish, shellfish, and
wildlife and provides for recreation in and on the water be achieved by
July 1, 1983. "98 While these statements have been criticized as overly
ambitious," they demonstrate the serious nature of the water pollution
problem in congressional minds at the time of enactment.
The centerpiece of the CWA is its establishment of water quality
related effluent limitations for point source discharges. 0 An effluent
limitation is a "restriction... on quantities, rates, and concentrations of
chemical, physical, biological, and other constituents which are
discharged from point sources."' 0 ' A point source is defined as "any
discernible, confined and discrete conveyance.., from which pollutants
are or may be discharged ."' ' 2 The effluent limitations themselves are
technology-based and vary by industry.'
For example, the CWA
required some industrial polluters operating at the time of its enactment
to use the best practicable technology to reduce water pollution by 197 7
and the best available technology by 1983."' Thus, technology plays a
critical role in achieving the lofty goals of the CWA.
96. Id. at 577.

97. 33 U.S.C. § 1251(a)(1)(1994).
98. Id. § 125 1(a)(2).
99. &ePERCIVAL, supra note 8, at 882 (noting that the goals contained in §101(a) have been widely
criticized by economists who question the wisdom of such a standard without reference to cost); Greve,
supra note 16, at 378 (suggesting that the goals of the CWA are "unattainable even in theory").
100. See33U.s.C.§ 1311 (1994).
101.
§ 1362(11).
102. Id. § 1362(14).
103. & PERCIVAL, supra note 8, at 880.
104. S 33 U.S.C. § 1311. The deadlines changed with subsequent amendments of the CWA. For
industrial facilities, BAT applied to toxics by 1984 and BCT to conventional pollutants in the 1977
amendments. In the 1987 amendments, BAT applied to toxics no later than March 31, 1989. See id
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To administer the effluent limitations, Congress established the
National Pollution Discharge Elimination System (NPDES) in Section
402 of the CWA. "5 Under the NPDES, polluters must obtain a permit
stating the allowable amount of pollutant that the polluter may
discharge into waterways." 6 The EPA is responsible for granting
permits in general, but states may take responsibility for that task if their
water pollution control programs meet minimum federal standards." 7
In addition, polluters must periodically file discharge monitoring reports
that list the actual and permitted levels of pollutant discharged over a
given time.' o8 These discharge monitoring reports are public information and can be used as evidence in enforcement actions.' 0 9
While the EPA or the states have the ability to enforce the effluent
limitations, the CWA also contains a citizen suit provision like many of
the other environmental statutes." 0 The CWA authorizes citizens to
bring civil actions against "any person . . . who is alleged to be in
violation of... an effluent standard.""' The word "citizen" is specifically defined in the CWA's citizen suit provision as "a person or persons
having an interest which is or may be adversely affected.' 2 Furthermore, citizens may bring a civil action against the EPA Administrator
for an alleged failure to perform a nondiscretionary duty under the
CWA."'3 Before bringing any action, however, citizens must provide
sixty days notice to the EPA Administrator, the state in which the
alleged violation occurs, and to the violator. 14 Also, a citizen suit is
banned if the EPA Administrator or the state is "diligently prosecuting"
a civil or criminal enforcement action." 5 If a citizen suit is successful,
courts may issue injunctive relief or civil penalties to punish violators. "6
In addition to these penalties, courts are authorized to award litigation
costs to any prevailing or substantially prevailing party if such is
appropriate. 17

105.
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.
111.
112.
113.
114.
115.
116.
117.

33 U.S.C. § 1342 (1994).
Sewid
See id. § 1342(b).
See id § 1318(a),(b).
&e Dolgetta, supra note 10, at 711.
See supra note 19 (listing the other environmental statutes).
33 U.S.C. § 1365(a) (1994).
Id§ 1365(g).
Sad § 1365(a)(2).
See id § 1365(b)(1)(A).
Id § 1365(b)(I B).
Seid § 1365(a).
Ske id.
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V. STANDING CASES UNDER THE CLEAN WATER ACT

Given the uncertainty regarding the standing of plaintiffs in environmental cases in general, the standing of citizens bringing suit to remedy
permit discharge violations is predictably unstable. Some courts have
required plaintiffs to demonstrate that a permit violation damaged the
environment in a scientifically proven manner before granting standing
to plaintiffs under the CWA. In contrast, other courts have taken a
broader view of standing by reasoning that mere permit exceedances
meet the requirements for standing. Because of the wavering requirements for standing that depend upon the location of the court, plaintiffs
are uncertain about their collective right to enforce the CWA. In short,
the law of standing under the CWA leaves plaintiffs in limbo because
cases proceed based upon the biases of the courts hearing the cases.
A. EnvironmentalHarm
In PublicInterest Research Group of.ewJersqy v. Magnesium Elektron, " 8 two
citizen groups brought suit against the defendant for violating its
NPDES permit and failing to follow reporting requirements." 9 To
support a motion for declaratory judgment on the issue of standing, the
plaintiffs offered four affidavits from their members. 2 The affidavits
generally stated that the members recreated on the affected waters and
that their enjoyment of these activities decreased because they knew the
water contained pollution. 2 ' One affiant stated that she avoided eating
fish from the affected waters because she was "concerned that those fish
might be contaminated with harmful pollutants."'2 Another affiant
avoided drinking water from the affected waters because she was
"concerned that the water might be contaminated."'2
Based upon
these affidavits, the district court found that the plaintiffs met the injury
standing and the court assessed a $2.625
in fact requirement to obtain
24
million dollar penalty.
During the penalty phase of the hearing, the defendant presented
expert testimony in an attempt to decrease the amount of the penalty.
A limnologist for the defendant stated that the discharge violations
118.
119.
120.
121.

123 F.3d 111 (3d Cir. 1997).
Id. at 114.
S id. at 115.
&e id. (describing other activities affected by the defendant's violation as including "studying

nature").
122. Id. Affiant Sandra Silverstone avoided the fish from the Delaware River. S id
123. Id. (affidavit ofJulie HowaO.
124. See id. at 116. & Public Interest Research Group, Inc. v. Magnesium Elektron, Inc., No. 89-

3193,1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20748 (D.NJ. Mar. 9, 1995)).
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caused no harm to the waterway. 25 Moreover, the expert asserted that
the violations might have improved the ecosystem by providing nutrients
in which it was lacking. 126 Although the expert performed her studies
almost ten years prior to the violations, the parties agreed that the study
provided adequate evidence of the environmental impact of the
discharges. 27 As a result, the defendant gained a valuable weapon to be
used on appeal.
On appeal, the defendant argued that the plaintiffs did not have
standing because they did not demonstrate injury in fact. 128 Because the
discharges did not harm the environment, the defendants argued, they
did not injure the plaintiffs. After dancing around the law of the case
doctrine,' 29 the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit
proceeded to rule on the defendant's assertion. The court first examined the Congressional intent underlying the Clean Water Act and
found that the "Act does not authorize private causes of action against
polluters absent some showing of injury or threat of injury."' 3 ° Noting
that generalized grievances are insufficient to support standing, the
Court reasoned that the affidavits failed to demonstrate injury in fact
beyond that which is shared generally.' 3 ' The court opined that the
"right" to have businesses comply with environmental laws does not
meet the requirements to obtain standing. 3 2 Plaintiffs must show "more
than 'a mere exceedance of a permit limit' to prove a judicially
cognizable injury."' ' In this case, the plaintiffs did not allege any injury
to the waterway such as a salinity change or a decrease in the number
of fish.'34 The members only pointed to a decrease in recreational
activity to show injury, but that did
not support standing when the
35
injury.'
no
suffered
itself
waterway
125. See PublicInterest Research Group, 123 F.3d at 116.
126. See id.
127. &e id. The violations occurred in 1989.
128. S&eid. at 114.
129. &eid. at 116-18. The law of the case doctrine prevents courts from reexamining issues resolved
earlier in the history of the litigation. Here, the court asserted that the new evidence showing a lack of
environmental harm justified their inquiry into the standing of the plaintiffs to pursue the case because it
undermined the conclusion of the lower court.
130. Id. at 120.
131. See id. at 121 (stating that "[tihe knowldge that a corporation has polluted waters is an 'injury'
suffered by the public generally. An environmentalist in Colorado or a botanist in California may feeljust
as strongly about MEI's violation of its discharge permit as do the plaintiffs in this case. Nevertheless,
absent a showing of actual, tangible injury to the River or its immediate surroundings, PIRG's members
are no less 'concerned bystanders' than any other citizen who takes an interest in our environment").
132. Said.
133. Id. (citing Public Interest Research Group ofNewJersey, Inc. v. Powell Duffryn, 913 F.2d 64,
72 (3d Cir. 1990)).
134. &eid. (comparing PoueDuffyn where plaintiffs complained of the color and smcll of the water).
135. S&e
id. (observing that not only did the violations not harm the waterway, but they also posed no
threat to the waterway).

174

UNIVERSIT" OF CINCIfNA TI LA WREVIEW

[Vol.69

Although the discharge violations resulted in no environmental harm,
the Third Circuit suggested that the plaintiffs could obtain standing if a
threat of injury existed." 6 In considering whether a threat of injury
existed, the court construed the meaning of the phrase "may be
adversely affected" in the CWA's definition of "citizen" as being
"inherently limited by the injury prong of the constitutional test for
standing."'3 7 Not only must plaintiffs show that they "may be adversely
affected," according to the court, but they must also show that "their
threat of injury is imminent.""'8 Moreover, the injury must be "so
imminent as to be 'certainly impending' to prevent ruling on speculative claims. 3 9 In this case, the district court could not have reasonably
concluded that the threat of injury was "certainly impending" given that
the evidence demonstrated no environmental harm resulted from the
discharges. 4 ' In the end, the Third Circuit ruled that the plaintiffs
to pursue their claim and vacated the judgment of the
lacked standing
1
lower court. 14

While some courts require environmental harm before granting
standing to plaintiffs, other courts take a broader view of the standing
requirements. In Student Public Interest Research Group ofNew Jersqy, Inc. v.
Georgia-PacificCorp.,42 for example, the plaintiffs submitted nine affidavits
to support their claim of standing to pursue the lawsuit. 43 According to
the court, these affidavits described various "actual and potential
detrimental impacts on their aesthetic, recreational, conservational,
economic and health interests due to pollution of the Delaware
River."' Challenging the issue of causation, the defendant offered
136. Sm id.at 122.
137. Id.
138. Id.
139. Id. (citing Whitmore v. Arkansas, 495 U.S. 149, 155-58 (1990)).
140. Id ("Although evidence of generic harm might support standing in other contexts, it fails to
support a claim of threatened injury once the defendant proves in the particular case before the court that
those harms are unlikely.").
141. Sw id. at 125; seeaL/o Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Gaston Copper Recycling Corp., 9 F. Supp.
489 (D.S.C. 1998) (holding that plaintiffs did not have standing because they did not show harm to the
waterway in the form of a decrease in salinity, ctc.); Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., Energy
Research Found. v. Watkins, 954 F.2d 974 (4th Cir. 1992) (reporting that the lower court held that the
plaintiffs failed to demonstrate injury in fact because they did not "allege with sufficient specificity" that the
river was harmed by pollutants); Citizens for a Better Env't v. Caterpillar, Inc., 30 F. Supp. 2d 1053, 1066
(C.D. III. 1998) (scrutinizing an expert's testimony to determine if injury exists); Concerned Area Residents
for the Env't v. Southview Farm, 834 F. Supp. 1410, 1415 (W.D.N.Y. 1993) (referring to geology and soil
chemistry experts to support its finding of standing for plaintiffs); American Ass'n v. City of Wilson
Wastewater Treatment Plant, consolidated case Nos. 5:96-CV-838-BR(2), 5:97-CV-47 I-BR(2), 5:97-CV665-BR(2), 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7766, at *15 (E.D.N.C. Mar. 31, 1998) (stating that plaintiff had
standing because "p]laintiff has established violations, and has shown harm to the creek").
142. 615 F. Supp. 1419(D.NJ. 1985).
143. Id at 1423.
144. Id.
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expert testimony stating that the pollution level was "so small that it is
not discernible" and that the pollution itself could not "change the
nature of the water."' 45 Recognizing the defendant's attempt to raise
the injury in fact hurdle, the court declared that the defendant sought
to use "language concerning causation in order to veil an attempt to
impose a quantitative test for proof of an injury-in-fact."' The court
rejected the defendant's argument and found that the plaintiffs had
standing to pursue their case. 47
B. Permit Exceedances
By requiring environmental harm for standing, courts implicitly reject
the notion that permit violations alone constitute injury in fact or
causation sufficient to satisfy standing inquiries. Without a showing of
environmental harm, the only harm upon which plaintiffs may base a
claim is the exceedance of a NPDES permit limit. Because such a claim
involves no real world consequences, it is akin to a procedural violation
of the law. This view of permit violations transforms concrete environmental harms into generally shared grievances about the failure to
comply with the law and these generally shared grievances are barred
by modern standing analysis. As a result, the dispositions of cases solely
involving permit violations vary depending upon the court's conception
of the breadth of the standing doctrine.
In Public Interest Research Group of New Jerse, Inc. v. Powell Duffiyn
Terminals, Inc., 14 an environmental group brought suit to penalize a
business for dumping pollutants into a body of water in excess of its
NPDES permit limit.'4 9 To meet the requirements of the standing
analysis, the plaintiffs submitted affidavits averring various aesthetic
harms that resulted from the permit exceedances.'5" However, the court
opined that "a permit exceedance alone is not sufficient" to confer
145. Id.
146. Id. at 1424.
147. See id. at 1425; see also Sierra Club v. Cedar Point Oil Co., 73 F.3d 546, 556 (5th Cir. 1996)
(refuting defendant's argument that more must be shown than a mere interest in the water to obtain
standing); Hudson River Keeper, Inc. v. Yorktown Heights Sewer Dist., 949 F. Supp. 210,212 (S.D.N.Y.
1996) (holding that plaintiffs had standing to pursue claim without showing environmental harm but
denying preliminary injunctive relief without such a showing); Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.
v. Texaco Ref. & Mktg., Inc., 800 F. Supp. i, 9 (D. Del. 1992) (holding that plaintiffs had standing to
pursue a suit based upon permit violations despite evidence that the waterway was allegedly swimmable and
fishable).
148. 913 F.2d 64 (3d Cir. 1990).
149. Ia The violations occurred during the transfer of stored products from tanks to other
containers. See id The plaintiffs alleged more than 200 violations. Sa id
150. &ee id. at 71. The affidavits alleged a decrease in recreational usage of the waterway and that the
brown color of the water and its odor offended the plaintiffs. See id
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standing, and went on to state that it "will require more than showing
a mere exceedance of a permit limit" to obtain standing to pursue a
case. "' Despite this pronouncement, the court found that the plaintiffs
affidavits met the requirements for standing and allowed the case to
proceed.' 52
Other courts, however, take a broader view of the standing requirements as they relate to violations of NPDES permits. In Student Public
Interest Research Group ofNew Jersey, Inc. v. P. D. Oil & Chemical Storage,
Inc.,"3' an environmental group brought suit against the defendant
54
alleging that the defendant violated its NPDES permit 154 times.
The violations resulted from spillage during the transfer of liquid
commodities from storage tanks to railcars and runoff from outfall pipes
connected to an overflow tank system."15 Challenging the standing of
plaintiffs to bring suit, the defendant asserted that the plaintiffs did not
suffer injury in fact and could not show a connection between the
violations and the harm allegedly done. 156 Reviewing affidavits
submitted by the plaintiffs to demonstrate injury in fact, the court found57
that the plaintiffs showed injury according to Sierra Club v. Morton."
Taking a lenient view of standing, the court stated that "[p] laintiffs show
causation merely by showing violations of the discharge permits."'"M To
rule otherwise "would have the Court apply a stricter test for standing thanfor
liability itsetf"159 .Thus, this court weighed permit violations in a manner
more favorable to environmental plaintiffs by holding that permit
violations alone satisfied various aspects of the standing inquiry.

151. Id. at 72-73. The court was discussing the second prong ofstanding analysis, however. Se id
152. Seeid. at 73; seealso American Canoe Ass'n v. City of Wilson Wastewater Treatment Plant,
consolidated case Nos. 5:96-CV-838-BR(2), 5:97-CV-47 I-BR(2), 5:97-CV-665-BR(2), 1998 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 7766, at *12 (E.D.N.C. Mar. 31, 1998) (reiterating the rule that a plaintiff must show more than
a mere permit exceedance to obtain standing); Public Interest Research Group of New Jersey, Inc. v.
Magnesium Elektron, Inc., 123 F.3d 111, 121 (3d Cir. 1997) (stating a plaintiffmust show "actual, tangible
injury to the River or its immediate surroundings," and "more than a mere exceedance of a permit limit"
for standing purposes.); Friends ofthe Earth, Inc. v. Gaston Copper Recycling Corp., 9 F. Supp. 489, 600
(D.S.C. 1998) (stating that "knowledge that defendant has exceeded the effluent limits set by its NPDES
Permit does not, standing alone, demonstrate injury or threat of injury").
153. 627 F. Supp. 1074 (D.NJ. 1986).
154. Id. at 1080.
155. See id.
156. Sa id.
157. &e id. at 1081-82 (describing the various recreational and aesthetic interests that had been
harmed by the permit violations).
158. Id. at 1083.
159. Id. (citing Student Pub. Interest Research Group ofNewJersey, Inc. v. Gcorgia-Pac. Corp., 615
F. Supp. 1419, 1424 (D.NJ. 1985)).
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C. The Laidlaw Decision

Given the confusion in the lower courts as to what is required to show
injury in fact, the Supreme Court had the opportunity to clarify the issue
in Friendsofthe Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Environmental Services(TOC), Inc.'6 ° In
Laidlaw, the plaintiffs sought declaratory relief, an injunction, and civil
penalties as a result of defendant's repeated violations of its NPDES
permit. "6 ' To demonstrate standing at trial, the plaintiffs submitted
affidavits of its members that allegedly showed injury in fact.'62 One
affiant stated that the waterway "looked and smelled polluted" and
refrained from recreational activity on the water because he was
"concerned that the water was polluted by Laidlaw's discharges."'' 63
Another affiant claimed that he would fish in a spot like he did as a boy
but for his "concerns about Laidlaw's discharges."' 64 Similarly, the
plaintiffs provided the trial court with five other affiants who claimed to
have decreased recreational usage of the waterway and "concerns"
about the pollution in the water.'65
To counter these claims of injury in fact in the district court, the
defendant offered expert testimony suggesting that the violating
discharges caused no environmental harm. To make its claim, the
defendant introduced the results of various scientific tests performed on
the indigenous fish of the waterway. 66 Based upon these tests, the court
found that the "overall quality of the river" surpassed "levels necessary
to support propagation of fish, shellfish, and wildlife, and recreation in
and on the water."'' 67 In fact, one test showed that the level for one
pollutant (mercury) in fish did not accumulate in their tissues to a point
even close to the FDA action level.' 68 In a broader study, the defendant's tests showed "no adverse effect on the indigenous biological
community" of the affected waterway.'69 Thus, the district court
concluded that there had been' 70"no showing of any significant harm to
the environment in this case."'

160. 120 S. Ct. 693 (2000)
161. Id. at 701-02. There were 489 alleged violations between 1987 and 1995. See id
162. See id. at 704-05 (reviewing six affidavits in total).
163. Id. at 704.
164. Id.
165. See id. at 704-05.
166. Friends ofthe Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs. (TOC), Inc., 956 F. Supp. 588,600 (D.S.C.
1997).
167. Id. (arising from nine years of semiannual acute and chronic toxicity tests).
168. Se id. The level ofmercury in the fish study showed mercury about .25mg/kg, which is less than
25% of the level required to trigger FDA action. See id.
169. Id.
170. Id.
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Despite its conclusion that no environmental harm occurred to the
waterway, the district court proceeded to assess a civil penalty. In fact,
the district court decision contains no discussion regarding the standing
of the plaintiffs to bring the case. The court merely counted the lack of
environmental harm as one of the factors used to determine the amount
of the civil penalty. 7 ' Noting that the defendant had substantially
complied with its permit limit since the initiation of the case, the court
imposed a civil penalty of $405,800.72 Turning its attention to the
requests for equitable relief, the court refused to grant an injunction or
other equitable reliefbecause of the absence of environmental harm and
the defendant's substantial compliance with its permit limit since the
inception of the case.173
While the district court used the lack of environmental harm as a
factor to mitigate the civil penalty, the United States Court of Appeals
for the Fourth Circuit used it as the foundation for its decision. After
enumerating the general requirements for standing, the court noted that
the plaintiffs failed to appeal the denial of equitable relief.7 ' However,
the court assumed "without deciding that Plaintiffs had standing to
initiate this action and have proven a continuous injury in fact."' 75 As
a result, the court shifted its focus from the first prong of standing
analysis to the third prong. Based upon the decision in Steel Co. v. Citizens
for a Better Environment,'76 the court decided that the plaintiffs' case was
moot because the payment of a civil penalty to the U.S. Treasury was
not a remedy for a cognizable Article III injury.' 77 The Fourth Circuit
vacated the district court decision and instructed it to dismiss the

171. Sie
id.
at 602-03 (examining the seriousness of violations, economic benefit of noncompliance,
the history of violations, good faith compliance efforts, the economic impact of the penalty upon the
defendant, and other matters as justice required to determine the amount of the penalty).
172. See id.at 610 (calculating the penalty based upon mercury exceedances and
monitoring/reporting violations).
173. Se id.
at 611 (observing that the defendant had substantially complied with its permit limits since
1992).
174. See Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl. Serv. (TOC), Inc., 149 F.3d 303, 306 (4th Cir.
1998).
175. Id. at 306 n.3.

176. 523 U.S. 83 (1998).
177. See Laida, 149 F.3d at 306. Sel Co. v. CilizeesforaBuerEw't,523 U.S. 83 (1998), involved a
citizen suit under the Emergency Planning and Community Right-To-Know Act of 1986. A majority of
sixJustices held that Article III concerns prohibited litigation to penalize "wholly past" violations of an
environmental statute. Id at 91. Furthermore, the Court held that a citizen suit plaintiff lacked standing
to pursue a case without alleging the existence of a continuing violation or a threat of a future violation.
The majority found the issue to be moot despite recognizing that the plaintiffs had suffered a judicially
cognizable injury as a result of the violation because an injunction could not redress the past injury of the
plaintiffs. Se id
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case-a result that left the plaintiffs with even less than they had before
the appeal."' 8
By appealing the case to the Supreme Court, the plaintiffs offered the
Court the opportunity to clarify the standing doctrine as applied in
environmental cases. After reciting the facts, the Court declared that it
had an "obligation" to assure itself that the plaintiffs had standing at the
beginning of the case. 79 As a result, the court began by reiterating the
general requirements for standing. 8 ' Noting that the lack of environmental harm played a role in lower court decisions, the Court announced that "[t]he relevant showing for purposes of Article III
standing, however, is not injury to the environment but injury to the
plaintiff."'' The Court believed that "[t]o insist upon the former rather
than the latter

. . .

is to raise the standing hurdle higher than the

necessary showing for success on the merits in an action alleging
noncompliance with an NPDES permit."' 8 2

After reviewing the

affidavits submitted by the plaintiffs to demonstrate injury in fact, the
Court found that they documented injury in fact under Sierra Club v.
Morton.'83 In the end, the Supreme Court held that the plaintiffs had
standing to bring the case thereby confirming
the mere assumption of
84
the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals.
Writing in dissent, Justice Scalia criticized the reasoning of the
majority for their failure to require specific allegations of injury in fact.
In general, wrote Justice Scalia, an environmental plaintiff points to
environmental harm that leads to injury to him.'85 However, this
argument could not be made in this case because of the district court's
conclusion that the discharges caused no environmental harm. While
the dissent agreed that injury to the plaintiff and not to the environment
was the relevant showing under Article III, the plaintiff must show
personal harm."' As a result, "a lack of demonstrable harm to the
environment will translate.., into a lack of demonstrable harm to
citizen plaintiffs."' 87 For the dissent, "[i]t is the reality of the threat of
178. &eeLaidaw, 149 F.3d at 307.
179. See Friends ofthc Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envd. Servs. (TOC), Inc., 120 S. Ct. 693, 703-04 (2000)
(noting that the lower courts did not examine the issue ol'standing and apparently assumed its existence).
180. &eid.(citing Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555,560-61 (1992); Hunt v. Washington
State Apple Adver. Comm'n, 432 U.S. 333, 343.(1977)).
181. Laidlaw, 120 S. Ct. at 704.
182. Id.
183. See id. at 705 (citing decreased recreation, fears about pollution, etc.).
184. See id. at 707-08.
185. S,# id. at 713-14 (ScaliaJ., dissenting) (joined byJustice Thomas).
186. See id. at 714 (Scalia,J., dissenting) (stating that the majority statement regarding the relevant
showing for Article III as being injury to the plaintiff and not injury to the environment "is correct, as far
as it goes").
187. Id. (Scalia,J., dissenting).
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to the standing inquiry, not the plaintiff's
repeated injury that is relevant
88
apprehensions."'
subjective
To demonstrate the flimsy nature of the plaintiffs' injury in fact, the
dissent examined the affidavits submitted by the plaintiffs. One affiant
who said she would recreate on the water but for her concern about
pollution had only been to the river a total of two times."8 9 The affiant
who claimed to be deprived of a favorite boyhood fishing spot had not
been there since he was a boy and stated that the pollution did not cause
him to stop visiting the water. Moreover, the dissent noted that other
affiants testified to similar "concerns" or beliefs regarding the
pollution.' 90 However, these subjective apprehensions could not have
been caused by the permit exceedances because the lower court found
that they "did not result in any health risk or environmental harm."''
Giving weight to these averments of general harm contravened the
command in Lujan that plaintiffs suffer a "'concrete and particularized'
injury."' 92 According to the dissent, the Court's decision made the
"injury-in-fact requirement a sham," because
"it would be difficult not
' 93
to satisfy" the Court's "lenient standard."'
VI. ANALYSIS

Because of its impact on citizen enforcement of environmental
statutes, Laidlaw is an important addition to modern standing jurisprudence. Indeed, the fear existed that an unfavorable decision would
further restrict the access to courts for environmental plaintiffs."
Although the result of Laidlaw is certainly not a loss for environmental
plaintiffs, it is a mixed blessing in terms of standing. For purposes of
standing, environmental plaintiffs chalked up a victory on the issue of
proving environmental harm. The Court, however, failed to extend
standing to the proper scope intended by Congress under the CWA. As
a result, environmental plaintiffs remain in danger of being tossed out
of court because of imprecise pleading.
188. Id. (Scalia,J., dissenting) (alteration and emphasis in original) (citingLos Angeles v. Lyons, 461
U.S. 95, 107 n.8 (1983)).
189. Se Id,
120 S. Ct. at 714 (ScaliaJ., dissenting). The affiant stated that she had bcen to the
river
once in 1980 and once after the initiation of the lawsuit.
190. See id. at 713 (ScaliaJ., dissenting) (stating that plaintiffs must assert specific facts to demonstrate
injury in fact and not simply set forth general allegations of injury).
191. Id. at 714 (ScaliaJ., dissenting).
192. Id. at 713 (ScaliaJ., dissenting).
193. Id. at 715 (ScaliaJ., dissenting).
194. SeeFrance, spra note 2, at 36 (recording a statement by plaintiffs attorney describing the fear
that a requirement of environmental harm be shown to obtain standing to sue would be prohibitively
expensive for plaintiffs).
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A. EnvironmentalHarm
With the holding that environmental harm need not be shown to
obtain standing, environmental plaintiffs achieved a significant victory
in Laidlaw. Although significant, the result is easily reached. To decide
the issue of citizen standing in CWA cases, courts generally cite to the
traditional prongs of analysis--injury in fact, causation, and
redressabiity. 95 Unfortunately, lower courts have held that damage to
the environment must be shown, but that is not supported by Supreme
Court precedent. Even the recent cases restricting standing for
environmental plaintiffs, such as Lujan and Defenders of Wildlif, do not
raise the standing hurdle to such an elevated height. No mention is
made of showing injury in fact plus or causation plus to achieve
standing. Thus, the decision in Laidlaw is a partial return to the broader
view of standing in the mold of Sierra Club v. Morton.
The refusal to require environmental harm is not only justified by
precedent, but also by the CWA itself Section 309(d) of the CWA
enumerates the factors to be considered when determining the amount
of a civil fine for a violation.' A court should "consider the seriousness
of the violation or violations, the economic benefit (ifany) resulting from
the violation, any history of such violations, any good-faith efforts to
comply with the applicable requirements, the economic impact of the
penalty on the violator, and such other matters as justice may require"
to determine the penalty amount. 97 The consideration of "the
seriousness of the violation or violations" contemplates an evaluation of
the environmental harm done at the penalty phase of environmental
litigation and not during standing inquiries. ' Ifenvironmental damage
exists, its extent is taken into account in the penalty itself. On the other
hand, if no environmental harm occurred, such a fact merely serves to
reduce potential penalties. The absence of environmental harm does
not mean that there is no penalty (i.e. no standing) because it is only one
of several factors used to determine the fine. For example, a violation
could cause no environmental harm and yet economically benefit the
violator. In such a case, a court may still impose a penalty on the
violator. In short, environmental harm is relevant to the penalty
amount and not to the standing of plaintiffs to pursue their claims.
195. Se e.g.,/Laidaw, 120 S. Ct. 693.
196. 33 U.S.C. § 1319(d) (1994).
197. Id.
198. Michael D. Montgomery, Aaijiqthe Lvuel of Compiance tith te Can WaterAct By Utiliing Citizen
mid the Broad Dissemination of nfomation to Enhance Civil Enforrement ofAN Act, 77 WASH. U. LQ 533, 548
(1999).
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In addition to recognizing its relevance to the imposition of penalties,
refusing to require environmental harm for standing purposes remains
faithful to the goals of the CWA. Congress chose to pursue the laudable
goals of eliminating the discharge of pollutants and making the nation's
waters fit for recreation.'99 To supplement enforcement of the Act's
regulations, Congress called on citizens to actively participate in the
enforcement efforts because of the limited resources of the
government. 00 To require environmental harm to obtain standing
would frustrate the intention of Congress. Although the monitoring
reports often used by citizen plaintiffs to prove exceedances are public
information, information costs still exist and can be high. 20 ' Requiring
environmental harm adds another cost to the plaintiffs account because
not only must information be gathered, but those violations must also
produce environmental harm. To prove environmental harm, plaintiffs
would have to hire experts to perform tests on the affected waters to
determine the extent of damage, if any. Depending upon their
resources, these costs could make litigation cost-prohibitive for some
plaintiffs. 20 2 It would be counterproductive for Congress to have lofty
goals whose attainment will be achieved with the aid of the public and
then make public participation exceedingly costly. Costly prosecution
leads to the potential for some violators to escape penalty, which
prevents the achievement of the CWA's goals.
B. PermitExceedances
Despite its refusal to require environmental harm for standing, the
Supreme Court's decision in Laidlawfails to extend standing to its proper
limit. After reasoning that environmental harm is not required for
standing, the Supreme Court reiterated that injury in fact remains as the
bedrock of standing analysis. As a result, the decision leaves open the
possibility that polluters who violate their NPDES permits will go
unpunished unless plaintiffs can show personal injury through proper
pleading. Indeed, many courts have stated that more than a "mere
exceedance" of a permit limit is required to show injury in fact.
However, these courts fail to acknowledge that Article III does not
require an injury beyond the invasion of a right created by Congress

199. Se 33 U.S.C.

§ 1251(a)(2)

(1994).

200. See- supra notes 13-19 and accompanying text.

201. S&eMontgomery, supra note 198, at 543-44.
202. SeeRichard E. Schwartz & David P. Hackett, Ctizen Suits Against Privatk Indussy Under the Cam
Water Act, 17 NAr. REsOURCESJ. 327,341 (1984).
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that is enforceable by a citizen suit.2 °3 As a result, the failure to punish

"mere exceedances" contravenes both the plain text of the CWA and its
legislative history while misapprehending the fundamental claims set
forth in affidavits to support standing.
1. Text
Given the power of Congress to bestow causes of action on citizens in
statutory form, "the starting point for interpreting a statute is the
language of the statute itself."2 4 The citizen suit provision of the CWA
states that "any citizen may commence a civil action."2 5 Later in the
same section, "citizen" is defined as a "person or persons having an
interest which is or may be adversely affected,"21" a phrase taken directly
from the APA.2 °7 Indeed, the APA grants standing to a person or
persons who may be "adversely affected or aggrieved... within the
meaning of a relevant statute."20 8 In terms of the CWA, the concept of
injury must be determined by reference to its provisions and not to
factual details that can be parsed as finely as the observer desires.
Exceeding an effluent limitation contained in a NPDES permit violates
the CWA. Congress extended enforcement powers to citizens who may
or may not be actually injured or threatened with injury. Because
citizen suit provisions have not been ruled unconstitutional, a permit
exceedance is injury in fact sufficient to sustain standing inquiries under
the CWA for citizen suit plaintiffs.
In addition to finding injury within the CWA itself, the definition of
"citizen" in the citizen suit section counsels that permit exceedances are
redressable by court action. The use of the words "is" and "may" in the
definition of "citizen" indicates a temporal aspect to the affected interest.
While "is" refers to a present injury, the word "may" refers to the mere
threat of an injury in the present or future. According to one court,
Congress used the word "to provide the courts with broad equitable
powers that.., extend to eliminating any risk posed." 2" Past or present
203. See Peter A. Aipert, Citicen Suits Under the Clem Air Ac" Universal Sinnftfor Me Uninjued M'ae
Attorny Genera' 16 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 283, 303 (1988).
204. Gwaltney of Smithfield, Ltd. v. Chesapeake Bay Found., 484 U.S. 49, 56 (1987) (quoting
Consumer Product Safety Comm'n v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 447 U.S. 102, 108 (1980)).
205. 33 U.S.C. § 1365(a) (1994).
206. Id. § 13 65(g).
207. See I A LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE WATER POLLUTION CONTROL ACT AMENDMENTS
OF 1972, at 221(1973) [hereinafter CWA LEG. HIST.].
208. 5 U.S.C. § 702 (1982).
209. Local Envd. Awareness Dev. Group v. Exide Corp., No. 96-3030,1999 U.S. Dist. Lexis 2672,
at *23 (E.D. Pa. Feb. 19, 1999) (interpreting the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA) and
quoting United States v. Price, 688 F.2d 204, 214 (3d Cir. 1982)).
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permit violations threaten future violations because violations indicate
technological or process failures that are generally not quickly corrected.
Keeping in mind that any "identifiable trifle" of an injury will support
standing,21° a permit exceedance creates a risk of injury that should be
remedied by the broad equitable powers of the judiciary.
In the case of these subsections, use of the word "may" evinces
Congressional intent to establish injury in fact for a broad class of
plaintiffs. In fact, the final citizen suit provision resulted from a
compromise between House and Senate bills.2 ' The House bill severely
restricted access to courts by providing that only those in the geographic
region of the violation should have access to the court." 2 Conversely,
the Senate bill mirrored the provisions of the APA in terms of who had
access to the courts. 21 ' In the end, the final provision is much closer to
the broad understanding of the Senate bill than the restricted view
offered by the House bill. Moreover, broad access to judicial relief
comports with the laudable goal of the CWA to eliminate "the discharge
of pollutants into the navigable waters" of the nation. 2"t To have any
hope to achieve such a goal, Congress required the aid of a broad class
of injured plaintiffs because of limited governmental resources." 5 As a
result, the word "may" must be construed to have a broad meaning
within the CWA and include permit violations with or without accompanying environmental harm.
To reinforce the breadth of the CWA's citizen suit provision,
Congress specifically defined the word "citizen" within the citizen suit
subsection. Notably, other environmental statutes do not contain a
definition of "citizen" and simply use the word "person" in its place." 6
While "person" has the same general meaning in all of the environmental statutes, the CWA goes one step further and defines "citizen" in
broad, sweeping terms. Thus, placing a broad definition
210. SCRAP, 412 U.S. 669, 689 n.14 (1973).
211. See I CWA LEG. HIST., supra note 207, at 328 (listing the House and Senate bills along with the
compromise contained in the conference substitute).
212. See H.R. 11,896, 92d Cong. § 505(g) (1972), reprinted in I CWA LEG. HIST., supra note 207, at
1077.
213. Sm S. 2770, 92d Cong. (1972), reprntedin 2 CWA LEG. HIST., supra note 207, at 1703-04.

214. 33 U.S.C. § 1251(a)(1) (1994).
215. &eDolgetta, supra note 10, at 712.
216. Set, e.g., Toxic Substances Control Act § 20, 15 U.S.C. § 2619(a) (1988); Endangered Species
Act § 11(g), 16 U.S.C. § 1540(g)(1) (1988); Resource Conservation and Recovery Act § 7002, 42 U.S.C.
§ 6972(a) (1982 & Supp. V 1987); Clean Air Act § 304, 42 U.S.C. § 7604(a) (1982); Comprehensive
Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act, 42 U.S.C. § 9659(a) (1982 & Supp. V 1987);
Safe Drinking Water Act § 1449, 42 U.S.C. § 300j-8(a) (1982 & Supp. V 1987); Surface Mining Control
and Reclamation Act of 1977 § 520,30 U.S.C. § 1270(a) (1988); Surface Marine Protection, Research, and
Sanctuaries Act § 105(g), 33 U.S.C. § 14 15(g)(1) (1988) (generally allowing "any person" to commence a
civil action as opposed to the usage of the word "citizen" in the Clean Water Act).
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of "citizen" within the citizen suit section demonstrates the Congressional intent to have a broad range of plaintiffs aid in the enforcement of
the CWA.
Despite the Congressional creation of injury for purposes of standing,
courts insist upon winnowing down the range of plaintiffs able to pursue
claims. However, these restrictions frustrate the intent of Congress
because when it wanted to place limits upon plaintiffs, it included those
limits within the statute itself. The citizen suit provision contains two
express limitations on the ability of plaintiffs to enforce the CWA. The
first of these limits is the sixty-day notice requirement contained in
§505(b)(l)(A). A plaintiff cannot file suit before giving sixty days notice
to the Administrator, the state in which the violation occurred, and the
violator." 7 The second limit bans a plaintiff from initiating a suit if the
Administrator or state has commenced and is "diligently prosecuting a
civil or criminal action in a court of the United States, or a State to
require compliance with the standard, limitation, or order.'21 8 Despite
recognizing injury in the form of a violation of a standard, limitation, or
order, Congress explicitly barred citizen enforcement in some cases in
favor of governmental action.
The ability of Congress to limit citizen plaintiffs is not only present in
the CWA, but also exists in many of the environmental statutes. Indeed,
many of the environmental statutes contain similar sixty-day notice and
diligent prosecution limits." 9 However, Congress knew how to enact
more stringent conditions when it desired, and did so in the Resource
Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA). To establish a claim under
RCRA, plaintiffs must allege that a defendant's acts "may present an
imminent and substantial endangerment to health or the environment."22 The presence of the phrase "imminent and substantial
endangerment" requires that a greater degree of harm must be alleged
to make a claim actionable. Instead, the citizen suit provision of the
CWA does not contain a phrase mandating that an escalated harm be
present for a plaintiff to claim injury. In comparison, injury under the
CWA is a broad concept without limitations other than those listed in
217. See 33 U.S.CQ § 1365(b)(1)(A) (1994).
218. ld. § 1365(b)(1)(B).
219. S, e.g., Toxic Substances Control Act § 20, 15 U.S.C. § 2619(b) (1988) Endangered Species
Act§ I l(g), 16 U.S.C. § 1540(g)(2)(A) (1988); Resource Conservation and Recovery Act§ 7002,42 U.S.C.
§ 6972(b) (1982 & Supp. V 1987); Clean Air Act §304, 42 U.S.C. § 7604(b) (1982); Comprehensive
Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act, 42 U.S.C. § 9659(d) (1982 & Supp. V 1987);
Safe Drinking Water Act § 1449,42 U.S.C. § 300j-8(b) (1982 & Supp. V 1987); Surface Mining Control
and Reclamation Act of 1977 § 520, 30 U.S.C. § 1270(b) (1988); Surface Marine Protection, Research,
and Sanctuaries Act § 105(g), 33 U.S.C. § 14 1 5 (gX2) (1988) (generally employing notice and diligent
prosecution limitations).
220. 42 U.S.C. § 6972(a)(1)(B) (1994).
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the CWA. As a result, injury in fact includes permit exceedances by
reference to the provisions of the CWA itself.
Despite the absence of words implying that an elevated level of harm
be present to sustain a case, courts impermissibly read them into the
CWA. In Public Interest Research Group, Inc. v. Magnesium Elektron, Inc.,221
for example, the court stated that the threatened injury due to a NPDES
222
permit violation must be so imminent as to be "certainly impending.
The court embraced this requirement because it prevented courts from
2 Contrary to this understandhearing cases about speculative injuries. 221
ing, the CWA contains no such imminence requirement. Furthermore,
neither Sierra Club v.Morton nor the APA, upon which the CWA is based,
contains such a stringent temporal requirement. Engrafting an
imminence requirement onto the CWA violates the written text of the
CWA and Congressional intent. If Congress intended to limit citizens
in their efforts to enforce the CWA, it knew how to do so.
2. Legislative History
After examining the text of the statute, investigating the legislative
history reinforces the notion that Congress intended that a broad class
of plaintiffs have access to the courts to remedy effluent violations. The
citizen suit provision began as a restricted concept in the House of
Representatives. The House bill provided for citizen suits against
violators of effluent standards, but defined "citizen" in a narrow fashion.
House Resolution 11896 defined "citizen" as one in the "geographic
area and... having a direct interest which is or may be affected. '22 *
The House believed that such a restriction did not provide a major
obstacle to plaintiffs because conservation groups could easily find a
local citizen to bring suit.225 Moreover, the restriction prevented the

courts from hearing frivolous claims brought by those not directly
affected by the pollution. 22 ' Notably, the House believed its provision
221. .No. 89-3193, 1995 U.S. LEXIS 20748 (D.NJ. 1995).
222. See supra notes 118-26 and accompanying text.
223. See supra notes 118-26 and accompanying text.
224. 1 CWA I.c. HIST., upra note 207, at 1077.
225. See I id at 663 (stating that"[t]he fact that suits must be brought by residents ofthe geographical
area... is not an unreasonable diminution of the right to sue. Conservation groups should experience no
difficulty in finding a qualified local citizen to bring a suit").
226. See id. at 663,674 (observing that "harassing lawsuits which would glut court calendars could
not be filed across the entire Nation by individuals from areas not affected." To the contrary, the House
believed restrictions necessary to limit the expanse ofcitizen suits. Discussing its definition of"citizen" in
lieu ofits usage of"person" elsewhere, the House feared that development would be stalled. Without words
oflimitation, Mr. Edmondson asserted that "anyone 3,000 miles away who wants to come in and file one
these lawsuits" would do so. Idat 674. In response, Mr. Hosmer retorted that "[w]e already have itinerant
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explicitly provided standing to citizen plaintiffs without judicial
interference. A report on the House bill states that "[t]he bill grants
standing to citizens of the area having a direct interest which is or may
be affected .... 22' Thus, the House bill purported to grant standing to
citizens so long as they met the bill's requirements.
In contrast to the restrictive House bill, the Senate bill tracked the
language of the citizen suit provision in the Clean Air Act of 1970. The
original Senate bill stated that "any person may commence a civil action
.. against any person... alleged to be in violation of... an effluent
standard or limitation under this Act., 22' Describing the provision, the
Senate Committee on Public Works noted that "[a]nyone may initiate
a civil suit against any person who is alleged to be in violation of an
effluent limitation. "229 Although the Committee shared the House's
concern about frivolous litigation, it reasoned differently and found it
unnecessary to restrict its provision as the House did. The Committee
noted that it had "added a key element in providing that the courts may
award costs of litigation, including reasonable attorney and expert
witness fees, whenever the court determines that such action is in the
public interest. '' 2 ° As a result, the courts could award these costs to
defendants if litigation proved
frivolous, which provides the necessary
23
deterrent to such litigation. 1
Given the discrepancy between the House and Senate bills, the
conference substitute reflects a compromise between the two. The
resulting citizen suit provision gave a "citizen" a right to commence a
civil action without geographic or direct interest limitations.232
Furthermore, the compromise defined "citizen" in its present-day form
as "a person or persons having an interest which is or may be adversely
affected. ' 23 Moreover, the definition of the word "citizen" reflected the
decision in Sierra Club v. Morton in terms of what qualified as an interest
under the CWA. As a result, the compromise that emerged from the
conference committee greatly expanded the House bill and very closely
resembled the broad understanding of the Senate.
The most important portion of the legislative history occurred during
enactment debates and sheds light on the Conference Committee's
intervenors who go around the country and persons meddling in problems that have significance locally
and not nationally for purposes where they are worthy").

227. H.R. 11,896, 92d Cong. § 505(g) (1972), repriinkdin I CWALEG. HIST., supra note 207, at 1077.
228. S. 2770, 92d Cong. (1972), reprtedin 2 CWA LEG. HIST., supra note 207, at 1703-04.
229. 2 CWA LEG. HIST., supra note 207, at 1497.
230. 2 Id. at 1499.
231. 2 Id. (noting that "[t]his should have the effcct ofdiscouraging abuse of this provision, while at
the same time encouraging the quality of the actions that will be brought").
232. 1 CWA LEG. HIST., supra note 212, at 221; seealso text accompanying note 212.
233.

33 U.S.C. § 1365(g) (1994).
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understanding of Siena Club v. Morton. During debate, Senator Bayh
inquired as to the meaning of "an interest which is or may be adversely
affected" by asking "[w] ould an interest in a clean environment-which
would be invaded by a violation of the Federal Water Pollution Control
Act or a permit thereunder--be an 'interest' for purposes of this
'
section?"234
In reply, Senator Muskie stated "[t]hat is the intent of the
' After noting that the Court interpreted section 10 of the
conference."235
APA much like section 50 5 (g) of the CWA, Senator Muskie quoted
extensively from Sierra Club v. Morton.236 Senator Muskie noted that the
Supreme Court held that "[a]esthetic and environmental well-being,
like economic well-being, are important ingredients of the quality of life
in our society, and the fact that particular environmental interests are
shared by the many rather than the few does not make them less
'
deserving of legal protection through the legal process." 237
Senator
Muskie continued by saying "it is clear that under the language agreed
to by the conference, a noneconomic interest in the environment, in
clean water, is a sufficient base for a citizen suit under section 505. "238
Concluding, Senator Muskie noted that he would "presume that a
citizen of the United States, regardless of residence, would have an
interest as defined in this bill regardless of the location of the waterway
and regardless of the issue involved. '2 39 In response, Senator Bayh
stated that he believed "that the conference provision will not prevent
any person or group with a legitimate concern about water quality from
bringing suit against those who violate the act or a permit. '
Although the search for legislative intent can often be a mysterious
misadventure, this is not such a case. Congress unequivocally intended
an "interest" in a clean environment, or more narrowly, in clean water
to be sufficient to meet the requirements of the meaning of "citizen" in
the CWA. To support its understanding, the Conference Committee
noted that even the Court in Sierra Club held that such broadly shared
interests could provide a judicially cognizable interest to support
litigation. Notably, the Conference Committee did not define interests
such as recreational activities to be required to bring suit, although those
certainly qualify under Sierra Club. Moreover, these comments make
clear that the Conference Committee understood that a simple violation
234. 1 CWA LEG. HIST., supra note 207, at 221 (noting that the two differences between the Senate
bill and the conference substitute involve the notice requirement before bringing suit and the definition of
"citizen").
235.
236.
237.
238.
239.

1 Id.
SeeI id
1 Id.
1 Id.
I Id.

240.

1 Id.
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of a permit limit would be actionable by a very broad class of plaintiffs
and did not understand permit violations to go without a remedy
because they were "mere exceedances. ' 241' Because Congress voted the
result of the House and Senate Conference Committee into law, those
understandings lay the foundation for the interpretation ofits provisions.
Simply put, Congress specifically gave citizens an interest in clean water
that is invaded by permit violations and these violations are subject to
suit in the courts of this nation. To hold otherwise frustrates Congressional intent and the law.
Reviewing the legislative history, it is clear that Congress intended to
define the injuries that qualified for standing purposes under the CWA.
The Conference Committee, for example, explicitly referred to injuries
such as those in SierraClub v.Morton when deciding about what could be
redressed by judicial action. Indeed, many courts refer to that case
when ruling on issues of standing. 2 2 However, Congress went one step
further in defining injury under tie CWA. According to the legislative
history, an interest in clean water that is violated by a permit
exceedance is an injury remediable by the courts. Defining such an
interest is merely a form of "environmental well-being" contemplated
by Sierra Club v. Morton. Polluted water, whether environmental damage
exists or not, harms the well-being of the environment. In fact, one
court noted that "[a] ny violations of these water quality based effluent
limitations causes some degree of harm ... .,,2"3 Because the effects of
pollution are cumulative, to allow even minute transgressions of the law
to go unpunished threatens to swallow pollution prevention laws as a
whole. While the harm might be minute, harm (i.e. injury) exists
nonetheless and qualifies as such under the CWA. Given the ambitious
goals of the CWA, permit violations alone must be understood to be
injury in fact for those seeking to enforce the CWA.
By refusing to apply the letter and intent of the CWA, courts violate
the principle of the separation of powers. Ironically, this claim is
frequently leveled at Congress in its enactment of the citizen suit
provisions themselves. 2 " . However, history and past judicial practice
241. See supra notes 234-40 and accompanying text. But cf Schwartz & Hackett, supra note 207, at
334 (stating that Senator Muskie's expansive view of standing "was explicitly rejected in Sirra Club v.
Morton").

242. See, e.g., Concerned Area Residents v.Southview Farm, 834 F. Supp. 1410, 1414 (W.D.N.Y.
1993); Citizens fora Better Env't v. Caterpillar, Inc., 30 F.Supp. 2d 1053, 1069 (C.D. I1.1998); Arkansas
Wildlife Fed'n v. Baekaert Corp., 791 F.Supp. 769, 776 (W.D. Ark. 1992); Hawaii's Thousand Friends
v. City & County of Honolulu, 806 F. Supp. 225, 231 (D. Haw. 1992).
243. American Canoe Ass'n v. City ofWilson Wastewater Treatment Plant, consolidated case Nos.
5:96-CV-838-BR(2), 5:97-CV-471-BR(2), 5:97-CV-665,BR(2), 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7766, at *16-17
(E.D.N.C. Mar. 31, 1998).
244. Sgenera/v Scalia, supra note 1; HaroldJ. Kent& Ethan G. Shenkman, OfCiirmn Suits and Citien
Sunstin, 91 MICH. L. REv. 1793,1806 (1993) (claiming that Congress cannot delegate enforcement duties
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demonstrate that "[t]here is no evidence of constitutional limits on the
' Indeed, the recent development of Article
power to grant standing."245
III limitations on the ability of plaintiffs to bring suits counsels that even
the judiciary did not recognize any constitutional standing limitations in
the past.2" Moreover, courts did not generally require facts demonstrating injury other than a simple showing of a statutory violation until the
1990s.247 Thus, the new fascination with the concept of injury,
particularly in environmental cases, began a new era of increased power
for the judges in the federal system.
Because of the structure of our system of government, an expansion
of power by one branch comes at the expense of another. In the case of
standing inquiries under the CWA, that other branch of government is
Congress itself. Creating an injury in fact test under the CWA that
limits the groups of people eligible to bring claims in spite of contrary
legislative intent enlarges judicial power at the expense of Congress.
The legislative history demonstrates that Congress deemed a simple
interest in clean water sufficient to satisfy the "interest" requirement for
Standing purposes. 2 However, courts repeatedly fail to acknowledge
these Congressional understandings by making plaintiffs demonstrate
some type of intimate personal harm via the form offact-filled affidavits.
Showings of this nature have no basis in the text or legislative history of
the CWA. In effect, the courts are restricting "the power of Congress
to define and protect against certain kinds of injury that the Court thinks
it improper to protect against.""
Given the nature of interests that currently qualify as injury under
modern analysis of the CWA, courts cannot help but inject their own
views into their decisions. For example, an interest in aesthetics is
purely subjective and will differ from person to person. Because of this
subjectivity, judges have wide latitude under current injury in fact
analysis to determine if injury exists. When deciding cases, courts inject
a "normative structure of what constitutes a judicially cognizable
injury." 2" Because of the malleability of the concept of injury in fact,
Forests: How Ma Cim.iSuii Provisionof Me
to disinterested citizens); Charles S. Abell, gnotiW th Trwsfor the
incn, 81 VA. L REv. 1957, 1966 (1995) (arguing
Clean WaterAa Vwlwaf thConsfibion'sSepationof P
that the provisions undermine the power of the Presidency, violate the Appointments Clause, and Article
III in general).
245. Sunstein, supra note 26, at 171.
246. SeeFletcher, supra note 28, at 224 ("It is at least clear that current standing law is a relatively
recent creation.").

247. Karin P. Sheldon, Steel Company v. Citizens fora Better Environment: Citte Can't Get No
Aych Satisfaction, 12 TUL ENVTL. LJ. 1, 29-30 (1998).
248. S&esupra notes 234-40 and accompanying text.
249. Fletcher, supra note 28, at 233 (comparing the usage of the injury in fact test to a form or

substantive due process).
250. Id.
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the standard for determining injury "has failed to provide a neutral and
objectively ascertainable method of measuring access to the federal
courts."' 25 ' In the end, the absence of an objective standard of injury
allows courts to manipulate the tests
for standing when deciding whether
252
to examine the merits of the case.
3. Evidence
In addition to honoring Congressional intent, recognizing a permit
exceedance as injury in fact disposes of the inquiries into the questionable affidavits submitted to support standing. Although well-intentioned, the affidavits of environmental plaintiffs frequently boil down to
an "academic exercise in the conceivable. 253 In Laidlaw, for example,
Justice Scalia's criticism of the plaintiffs affidavits is well-founded. After
all, one of the plaintiffs said that she did not use the water and another
said that pollution did not play a role in his decreased usage. 25 4 It
certainly strains reason to suggest that these individuals have suffered
injury in fact as the phrase is commonly understood.
Examining other cases demonstrates the malleable nature of the
concept of injury in fact. In some cases, injury in fact fits the traditional
model of the concept. In Local EnvironmentalAwarenessDevelopment Group
of Berks v. Exide Corp.,255 the court found that two of fifteen affidavits
submitted by plaintiffs demonstrated injury in fact.256 One affidavit
alleged a decrease in recreation because a park had been closed as a
result of lead contamination.257 A second affiant stated that the water
had caused "dead patches of grass" in her back yard and that "wild
ducks" had been driven away. 25 The affiant attributed these injuries to
the defendant because she, being more industrious than most plaintiffs,
found elevated levels of lead in her yard after having it tested.2 9 As a
result, these plaintiffs easily demonstrated that they had suffered injury
in fact.

251. Gene R. Nichol,Jr., RdUkig Standing, 72 CALL REV. 68,78-79 (1984) (observing that "[a]s
standingjurisprudencc began to embrace subjective and intangible interests, the term 'injury in fact' offered
little guidance in measuring the scope of the case or controversy requirement").
252. &e LAURENCE H. TRIBE, CONSTITUTIONAL CHOICES 100(1985).
253. SCRAP, 412 U.S. 669,688 (1973).
254. See supra notes 189-94 and accompanying text.
255. No. 96-3030, 1999 U.S. Dist. Lxis 2673 (E.D. Pa. Feb. 19, 1999)
256. Ild.
at *54 (finding that the other affiants failed to make specific allegations to support their water
pollution claims).
257. S id. (asserting that soil samples revealed lead contamination).
258. Id. at *55.
259. &v id.
(testing revealed 3,600mg/kg in the upper 3 inches of soil and 2,100mg/kg between
depths of 3 to 10 inches beneath the surface).
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In contrast to the clear showing of injury in fact in LEAD ofBerks, the
plaintiff's claim in Friends ofEarth v. ConsolidatedRail Corp.26° presents an
assertion of standing at the other end of the spectrum. In that case, an
affiant testified that "he passes the Hudson [River] regularly and find [s]
the pollution in the river offensive to [his] aesthetic values."" 6 ' The
Second Circuit found this flimsy allegation sufficient for standing
purposes for this plaintiff.262 Unlike the plaintiffs in LEAD of Berks, this
affiant suffered no physical invasion of property or claim that his
recreational use of the water decreased. This affiant merely drove over
the river regularly and did not like what he saw. The sight of the water
offended his "aesthetic values." However, an offense to one person's
sense of aesthetics is another's Venus de Milo. It is precisely because of
a case like Friends of the Earth v. Consolidated Rail Corp. that standing
inquiries under the CWA are criticized as exercises in pleading.
Determining whether a plaintiff has standing boils down to which facts
are selected for inspection and the value given to them.
Because courts require plaintiffs to leap through moving hoops to
show standing, the facts used to support standing appear distorted and
the underlying reasoning is tortured. Recognizing that permit violations
constitute injury in fact per se does away with the need for these
questionable assertions submitted to show standing. Indeed, such
recognition only explicitly confirms what courts currently allow without
the need for pleading exercises. Plaintiffs often claim that they are
"concerned" about pollution, "believe" a waterway is polluted, or
"know" that the affected water is polluted. Of course, plaintiffs are
typically aware of this because a corporation or industry has a NPDES
permit to pollute the water. What these plaintiffs are really asserting is
that a corporation has polluted in an amount greater than that which is
allowed by its NPDES permit. In other words, plaintiffs simply assert
that permit exceedances violate the CWA. Removing these affidavits
not only codifies common practice, but also saves time because courts
need not sift through them. In sum, recognizing permit violations as
injury in fact injects common sense into citizen suit proceedings, a
commodity sorely lacking in some cases.
VII. CONCLUSION

Because Laidlaw keeps the standing hurdle at a reachable height, it
must be viewed as a favorable decision for environmental plaintiffs.
260. 768 F.2d 57 (2d Cir. 1985).
261. Id at 61 (second and third alterations in original).
262. See
id.
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Indeed, the Laidlaw decision has already had an impact on lower court
standing decisions for environmental plaintiffs. The plaintiffs in Friends
of the Earth, Inc. v. Gaston Copper Recycling Corporation,263 for example,
reaped the benefits of Laidlaw upon appeal of their case.264 The lower
court held that the plaintiffs lacked standing to pursue their claim
because they failed to show injury in fact as a result of defendant's
permit exceedances.265 The district court declared that the plaintiffs
failed to present evidence "concerning the chemical content of the
waterways affected by the defendant's facility. No evidence of any
increase in the salinity of the waterways, or any other negative change
in the ecosystem of the waterway was presented." '66 However, the
appellate court reversed the lower court and held that the plaintiffs had
standing to continue the litigation.267 Applying Laidlaw, the Fourth
Circuit opined that an environmental plaintiff need not show environmental harm to obtain standing.268 Thus, the reversal in cases like
Gaston Copper demonstrates the importance of Laidlaw's environmental
harm holding.269
Despite the favorable impact of its holding, Laidlaw fails to expand
standing to the extent intended by Congress. Congress clearly intended
to expand the number of potential plaintiffs beyond the number
permitted by Laidlaw. It did not, however, intend to blow the court
doors wide open so that anyone can bring a claim. The chief obstacle
standing in the way of a rush to the courthouse is the award of litigation
costs and attorney fees ifjustice requires. When all is said and done,
litigation costs and attorney fees can be exceptionally high. Despite not
having to show environmental harm, plaintiffs will continue to perform
scientific tests on affected waters because they are relevant to the penalty
assessed by the court. Furthermore, defendants will conduct similar tests
to reduce the potential penalty. As a result, the threat of paying for a
defendant's testing and attorney fees instructs plaintiffs to pursue only
cases with merit.
In addition to deterring frivolous claims, the award of litigation costs
and attorney fees forces plaintiffs to choose cases in which they have a
direct interest because it is too costly to choose otherwise. So, a person
in Idaho will not be a plaintiff in a permit violation case in Florida
because it is too costly. An Idaho plaintiff would not only bear the
263. 204 F.3d 149 (4th Cir. 2000).
264. Id.
265. Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Gaston Copper Recycling Corp., 9 F. Supp. 589 (D.S.C. 1998).
266. Id. at 600.
267. See Fiend ofthe Earth, 768 F.2d at 45.
268. Seid. at 35.
269. S, e.g., Piney Run Ass'n v. County Comm'n, No. 82, F. Supp. 2d 464 (D. Md. 2000) (holding
that plaintiffs had standing to pursue their claim after citing to Laid/aw).
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threat of litigation costs and attorney fees, but would also bear the
financial burden of pursuing the case in Florida. For example, the
plaintiff from Idaho would have to pay travel, eating, and accommodation expenses in Florida while pursuing the case. When added to the
"frivolous lawsuit" costs, the risk for plaintiffs is too great. By adding
these costs to the CWA, Congress has in effect ensured that courts have
jurisdiction over potential plaintiffs. Much of environmental law is
about economics and it is those same economics that prevent plaintiffs
from bringing groundless or harassing claims.
The failure to recognize that Congress defined injury in fact within
the Clean Water Act not only ignores the frivolous litigation safeguards
in the CWA, but also disregards the nature of public law litigation.
Public law litigation enforces broadly held values whose importance is
reflected in legislation enacted by democratically elected individuals.
Moreover, it is well established that an "injury required by Art[icle] III
may exist solely by virtue of 'statutes creating legal rights, the invasion
of which creates standing."'27 Although the injuries suffered by
environmental plaintiffs are of a different kind, litigation to enforce
generally held environmental values embodied in statutes is nonetheless
a result of the democratic process."' Voters elect public officials who
sponsor legislation that generally comports with public consciousness.
Indeed, among the reasons that Congress enacted environmental
measures in the 1970's with little opposition were the political consequences of opposition in light of public awareness of environmental
problems. 2
Because the environmental statutes resulted from the democratic
process, this type ofpublic law litigation is not "a smokescreen that hides
the public policy oriented nature of the suit" by allowing courts to look
at form over substance. 3 In fact, the opposite is true for environmental
plaintiffs enforcing the CWA. Courts look at the substance of the injury
suffered and ignore that Congress defined the form of the injury that
allows a plaintiff to bring suit. By doing so, "politically unaccountable
federal judges . . . substitute their policy preferences for those of
politically accountable institutions. ' 274 The restriction of standing for
environmental plaintiffs isjust such an example of the judicial usurpation of Congressional power. So, when asked "What's it to you?" an
environmental plaintiff enforcing the CWA should take the CWA in one
270.
27 1.
272.
273.
274.
N.Y.U. L

Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490,500 (1975).
SeeSheldon, supra note 247, at 40.
Sm MILLER, supra note 13, at 5.
Abell, supra note 244, at 1985 n.168.
RichardJ. Pierce, Jr., 77t Role ofd judic
REV. 1239, 1277 (1989).
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hand and its legislative history in the other and reply, "Congress
historically has the power to confer legal interests upon citizens and it
has done so according to the text and legislative history of the CWA
itself."

